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PUTTING A PRICE ON CHILD PORN:
REQUIRING DEFENDANTS WHO POSSESS
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IMAGES TO PAY RESTITUTION
TO CHILD PORNOGRAPHY VICTIMS

ABSTRACT
The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation section of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 made it mandatory for federal courts
to order restitution to victims of certain crimes. The purpose of the statute
is not being fulfilled, however, when courts hold there is no causal connection between defendants who possess pornographic images of children and
the victims of child pornography. This article argues defendants possessing
child pornography images should be required to pay restitution to child
pornography victims under the mandatory restitution statute. Restitution is
necessary in order to fully compensate victims of child pornography for
their losses. Part II of this article gives a brief overview of federal criminal
restitution in order to give context to the mandatory restitution statute. It
also describes the statute and the elements of restitution to which child
pornography victims are entitled under the statute. Part III analyzes the
definition of “victim” under the statute and discusses the causation issues
that arise in defining a victim entitled to restitution under the statute. Part
IV describes a proposed amendment to the statute that would aid in
eliminating controversy surrounding the causation issue. Part V concludes
with the statute’s impact on the North Dakota federal court system.
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INTRODUCTION

Federal Judge Asks Prosecutors to Put a Price on Child Porn,1 Child
Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution,2 and Attorney Shifts Focus to
Target Child Porn,3 all recently published newspaper articles, illustrate the
growing importance of holding defendants who possess child pornography
images accountable to the victims by ordering the defendants to pay restitution to the victims. The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation
and Other Abuse of Children section of the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994 made it mandatory for federal courts to order restitution to victims
of certain crimes.4 Congress enacted the mandatory restitution statute to
formally recognize the need for victims of child pornography to be fully
compensated for their losses.5 The purpose of the statute is not being
fulfilled, however, when courts hold there is no causal connection between
defendants who possess pornographic images of children and the victims of
child pornography.6
The express language of the statute clearly dictates that restitution shall
be ordered to any “individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime
under [the Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children Chapter of
Title 18].”7 Defendants who possess pornographic images of children
continually harm the victims every time they view the images.8 Under the
statute, the child depicted in the pornographic images is a victim, and the
defendant convicted of possessing the images is required to pay restitution.9

1. James Walsh, Federal Judge Asks Prosecutors to Put a Price on Child Porn, STAR
TRIBUNE, Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.startribune.com/local/stpaul/80672902.html?page=1&c=y.
2. John Schwartz, Child Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010,
at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/03offender.html?emc=eta1.
3. Attorney Shifts Focus to Target Child Porn, THE FORUM (Fargo, N.D.), May 26, 2010,
http://www.inforum.com/event/article/id/279876/group/homepage/.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(4)(A) (2010) (“The issuance of a restitution order under this section
is mandatory.”).
5. See id. § 2259(b)(1) (stating “[t]he order of restitution under this section shall direct the
defendant to pay the victim . . . the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the
court . . . .”).
6. See discussion infra Part III.B.
7. See § 2259(c) (defining the term “victim” as “the individual harmed as a result of a
commission of a crime under this chapter . . . .”).
8. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing how the defendant causes the child to suffer by
receiving and viewing the pornographic images, thus perpetuating the existence of the images and
creating an economic incentive for creating and distributing the materials).
9. See discussion infra Part III.A (defining “victim” under the mandatory restitution statute);
see also Meg Garvin, How Current Restitution Law is Failing Victims in Child Abuse Image
Cases, 12 NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST. 1, 23 (2010) (noting it is well-established that child
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This article argues defendants possessing child pornography images
should be required to pay restitution to child pornography victims under the
mandatory restitution statute.10 Restitution is necessary in order to fully
compensate victims of child pornography for their losses.11 Part II of this
article gives a brief overview of federal criminal restitution in order to give
context to the mandatory restitution statute. It also describes the statute and
the elements of restitution to which child pornography victims are entitled
under the statute. Part III analyzes the definition of “victim” under the
statute and discusses the causation issues that arise in defining a victim
entitled to restitution. Recent court opinions examining the causal requirements of the statute are also discussed in this section. Part IV describes a
proposed amendment to the statute that would help eliminate some of the
controversy regarding the causation issue. Part V concludes with the
statute’s impact on the North Dakota federal court system.
II. FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
Federal criminal restitution is a relatively new area of law, especially
with regard to compensating victims of child pornography.12 In order to
fully understand the mandatory restitution statute, it is necessary to briefly
describe the history of federal criminal restitution and the policy behind it.
Part A of this section provides an overview of federal restitution statutes.
This discussion is essential to a thorough understanding of § 2259 because
of the similarities between other federal restitution statutes and § 2259. Part
B of this section describes the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual
Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children statute and the elements of
restitution to which child pornography victims are entitled.
A. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
Federal criminal restitution has become an increasingly important
issue, and legislatures continue to enact and amend restitution statutes in
order to compensate victims of certain crimes.13 As the concept of federal
criminal restitution has evolved, Congress has increasingly recognized

victims depicted in child abuse images should receive restitution from the defendants who possess
their images).
10. See discussion infra Part III.C (stating that victims of child pornography cases are
harmed by the defendant’s crimes and have a right to be compensated).
11. § 2259(b)(1).
12. See infra note 721 and accompanying text (describing that until recently, prosecutors had
not sought restitution on behalf of child pornography victims).
13. CATHARINE M. GOODWIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION, §§ 1:1, 1:3, at 1, 3
(2008).
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victims’ interests.14 This increased recognition of victims’ interests has resulted in broader statutory criteria and, as a result, stronger implementation
by federal courts.15
1.

History of Federal Restitution Law

The first federal restitution act, the Federal Probation Act, was enacted
in 1925.16 Under the Act, restitution was only imposed as a condition of
supervision.17 In 1982, legislatures enacted the Victim Witness Protection
Act (VWPA) to allow courts to impose restitution as a separate component
of the sentence.18 Restitution under the original VWPA was only discretionary, directing courts to take into account the defendant’s ability to pay
and the extent of the victim’s harm when ordering restitution.19 One of the
best known portions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,20
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,21 recodified the VWPA and reaffirmed restitution as a separate component of the sentencing process.22
In the 1990 case Hughey v. United States,23 the United States Supreme
Court held that the VWPA allowed restitution only for harm caused by an
offense of the conviction.24 After Hughey, Congress amended the VWPA
to allow restitution to be included for a scheme, pattern, or conspiracy if an
element of the offense.25 Parties could now agree to restitution to any
extent, in any case.26 Furthermore, parties could agree that restitution be
paid to persons other than the victims of the offense.27
In 1992, Congress enacted the first mandatory restitution statute, the
Child Support Recovery Act.28 This Act did not give courts discretion to
determine whether restitution should be awarded; the Act required courts to
order restitution in an amount equal to the total unpaid child support
14. Id. § 1:2, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Pub. L. No. 68-596, 43 Stat. 1260 (1925), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987,
2031 (1987).
17. GOODWIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION, supra note 13, § 1:2, at 2.
18. See Victim Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664).
19. Id.
20. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
21. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 36633664).
22. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 1:3, at 3.
23. 495 U.S. 411 (1990).
24. Hughey, 495 U.S. at 413.
25. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 1:3, at 3.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 340 (1992).
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existing at the time of sentencing.29 Congress enacted further mandatory
restitution statutes in 1994 under the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act.30 This Act ordered defendants to pay restitution for
certain title 18 offenses, such as violence against women, exploitation of
children, and telemarketing.31 The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
(MVRA) of 1996 greatly improved victim compensation by making restitution mandatory for a number of federal crimes.32 The MVRA dictated
that victims must be “directly and proximately” harmed by the offense of
the conviction in order to be awarded restitution under the Act.33 The
MVRA also required courts to compensate victims for the “full amount” of
the victims’ losses.34 Even though a number of federal restitution statutes
exist, the general purpose of all the restitution statutes remains the same.35
The next section explores Congress’ purpose in enacting restitution statutes.
2.

Purpose of Federal Restitution Law

The principal of restitution is an integral part of the criminal justice
system.36 “Restitution” means restoring someone to the position occupied
before a particular event took place.37 The purpose of restitution is to make
a victim whole.38 Congress enacted federal criminal restitution statutes to
improve the administration of justice by requiring federal criminal defendants to pay full restitution to the identifiable victims of their crimes.39 It is
essential to the criminal justice system that offenders be held accountable

29. 18 U.S.C. § 228(c) (1992).
30. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1904 (1994).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2248 (mandating restitution for sexual abuse crimes under §§ 2241-2245);
§ 2259 (mandating restitution for sexual exploitation of children crimes under §§ 2251-2258);
§ 2264 (mandating restitution for domestic violence crimes under §§ 2261-2262); § 2327 (mandating restitution for telemarketing crimes under §§ 1028-1029 and §§ 1341-1345).
32. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (mandating restitution for most federal offenses in which there is a victim); § 3664(f)(1)(A) (mandating that restitution be for the “full” amount of the victims’ harms,
regardless of the defendant’s financial experiences).
33. § 3663(a)(2).
34. § 3664(f)(1)(A).
35. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the purposes of federal restitution law).
36. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 2:1, at 12.
37. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990).
38. United States v. Crandall, 525 F.3d 907, 916 (9th Cir. 2008).
39. See S. Rep. No. 104-79, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925 (favorable report out of the Judiciary Committee on the Victims Justice Act of 1995, which became the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act); see also United States v. Reano, 298 F.3d 1208, 1211-12
(10th Cir. 2002) (citing the legislative history of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act); United
States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1249 (D. Utah 2004) (affirming the policy of federal
criminal restitution); United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1330 (D. Utah 2004)
(affirming the policy of federal criminal restitution).
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for their actions.40 The Judiciary Committee, in enacting the MVRA, stated
that justice cannot be served until full restitution is made to the victim of a
crime.41
The purpose of ordering a defendant to pay a monetary fine, often in
addition to serving a prison sentence, forces an individual defendant to
address the harm his crime has caused to the individual victims of his crime
and to society.42 Victims, especially victims of child pornography, frequently suffer both financial and emotional losses because they have to seek
counseling or medical services for the rest of their lives.43 The federal
government is responsible for requesting victim restitution and advocating
victims’ interests.44 It is the federal government’s goal that federal crime
victims receive the fullest possible restitution from criminal wrongdoers.45
The federal government must work to achieve this goal while balancing
both the resources available to assist the victims and the constitutional
rights of the defendant.46 Congress also works to advocate victims’ interests by enacting legislation such as the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual
Exploitation of Children statute in order to protect child pornography
victims and compensate the victims for their losses.47 The next section
describes the mandatory restitution statute for sexual exploitation of
children crimes and the elements of restitution to which victims are entitled
under the statute.
B. MANDATORY RESTITUTION FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
OF CHILDREN
The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of
Children statute makes restitution mandatory for any offense under chapter
110 of the United States Code.48 Courts have continued to affirm the
40. See S. Rep. No. 104-79, supra note 39, at 12.
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also H. Rep. No. 104-16, at 5 (1995).
43. See United States’ Response Re: Mandatory Restitution For Victims of Persons Who
Possess Child Pornography at 13, United States v. Cook, No. 4:08-cr-00024-RRB (D. Alaska July
16, 2009) (citing to the child pornography victim’s psychological consultation where the psychologist indicated that the victim would struggle with the effects of the abuse for the rest of her
life and the victim would require weekly therapy and perhaps even inpatient treatment at times,
throughout the course of her lifetime).
44. See GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 17:22, at 549.
45. 128 Cong.Rec. 27391 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
46. See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 420 (1990) (describing the policy behind the
Victim Witness Protection Act).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2010).
48. § 2259(c). Chapter 110 includes the following crimes: sexual exploitation of children;
selling or buying children; certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation
of children; and certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography.
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mandatory nature of restitution for crimes included in this chapter.49 Historically, most courts have imposed restitution under § 2259 in cases where
the defendant sexually abused the child victim or participated in the production of child pornography in which the child victim was depicted.50
However, § 2259 applies to all of the offenses in chapter 110, regardless of
whether a defendant personally participated in the sexual abuse, production,
and initial distribution of child pornography.51 Restitution is mandatory as
Id. §§ 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A. The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a) states, “[n]otwithstanding
section 3663 or 3663A, and in addition to any other civil or criminal penalty authorized by law,
the court shall order restitution of any offense under this chapter.” § 2259(a) (emphasis added).
Further, subsection (b) provides, “[t]he issuance of a restitution order under this section is
mandatory.” § 2259(b)(4)(A).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Scheidt, No. 1:07-CR-00293, 2010 WL 144837, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 11, 2010) (stating “it is clear that restitution is mandatory for any offense in [Chapter
110]”); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1249 n.101 (D. Utah 2004) (noting that
the court “shall order” restitution for offenses under Chapter 110, in a case in which defendant
was convicted of sexual exploitation of a child under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)); United States v.
Searle, 65 Fed. Appx. 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating “18 U.S.C. § 2259 provides that a person
convicted of sexual exploitation must pay restitution” (emphasis added)); United States v. Julian,
242 F.3d 1245, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 2001) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2259 as the mandatory
restitution for sexual exploitation crimes); United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 964-65 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting that § 2259 “requires a sentencing court to order a defendant convicted of a crime
involving the sexual exploitation of children to pay restitution to the victim of that crime”); United
States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125-26 (3rd Cir. 1999) (noting that restitution was mandatory
under § 2259).
50. See United States v. Johnston, No. 7:09-CR-72-D, 2010 WL 1640933, at *2 (E.D.N.C.
Apr. 6, 2010) (ordering the defendant to pay restitution under § 2259 totaling $1,662,930 for
manufacturing child pornography); United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 2007)
(upholding a $16,475 restitution order compensating eight victims for future expenses, including
two years of counseling, alternative education programs, vocational training, and a case management fee, in a case in which the defendant was convicted of producing child pornography and
engaging in illicit sexual conduct with minors in foreign places); United States v. Estep, 378 F.
Supp. 2d 763, 770-74 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (ordering $221,480.10 in restitution to three child victims
of sexual abuse and exploitation); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1249 (D. Utah
2004) (ordering the defendant to pay $79,968 to the victim in a case in which the defendant (the
victim’s adoptive father) was convicted of sexual exploitation of a child under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a)); Searle, 65 Fed. Appx. at 346 (upholding a $17,582.85 restitution order compensating
victims’ guardians for counseling, transportation to counseling expenses, the cost of remodeling
their home to accommodate the victims, and some of the cost of a vehicle purchased when custody
of the victims was transferred to the guardians, in a case in which the defendant was convicted of
receiving and producing child pornography); United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1247-48
(10th Cir. 2001) (finding that child victims were entitled to restitution for past medical and
counseling expenses, and future counseling or treatment costs in a case in which the defendant
was convicted of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, and conspiracy to commit offense, or to
defraud the United States); United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding
a $304,200 district court restitution order compensating the victim for the anticipated costs of
future therapy in a case in which the victim’s father was convicted of improper sexual contact
with his daughter); Laney, 189 F.3d at 964-67 (upholding a $60,000 restitution order in a case in
which the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to sexually exploit children in violation of
§§ 2251 and 2252, and distribution of visual depictions of minors); Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125-26
(upholding a $57,050.96 restitution order compensating the victim for medical expenses in a case
in which the defendant was convicted of receiving child pornography in violation of § 2252(a)(2),
but facts showed the defendant also participated in the production of the images).
51. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), (a)(4) (2010).
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a matter of law in cases involving the possession and distribution of images
depicting the sexual abuse of minors.52 If a defendant is convicted of a
crime under chapter 110, a court shall order the defendant to pay the victim
“the full amount of the victim’s losses.”53 The term “full amount of the
victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for: medical
services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; physical
and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; necessary transportation,
temporary housing, and child care expenses; lost income; attorney’s fees, as
well as other costs incurred; and any other losses suffered by the victim as a
proximate result of the offense.54 This section next explores the six
categories of “losses” for which child pornography victims are entitled to
restitution under § 2259. The frequency in which courts order restitution
awards for each of these categories is also discussed.
1. Medical Services Relating to Physical, Psychiatric, or
Psychological Care
Offenders who are convicted of a crime under chapter 110 are required
to pay restitution to the victim for any of the victim’s costs incurred for
medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care.55
Courts have upheld strong and broad restitution orders for medical services
when the costs are ascertainable at the time of sentencing.56 In United
States v. Crandon,57 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a restitution
award under § 2259 for psychiatric care where the defendant was convicted
of molesting a fourteen-year-old victim whom the defendant had met on the
Internet.58
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Laney,59 upheld
a restitution award for future psychological treatment and counseling for the
victim and her family.60 The award of future medical services was an issue

52. Id. § 2259(a).
53. Id. § 2259(b)(1).
54. Id. § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(F).
55. Id. § 2259(b)(3)(A).
56. See United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding Congress mandated broad restitution for a minor victim following an offender’s conviction of federal sexual
child exploitation and abuse offenses); see also United States v. Johnston, No. 7:09-CR-72-D,
2010 WL 1640933, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 6, 2010) (stating Congress chose generous terms in an
effort to fully compensate child victims for the care needed to address the long-term effects of
their abuse).
57. 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999).
58. Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125-26.
59. 189 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999).
60. Laney, 189 F.3d at 966.
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of first impression for the Ninth Circuit in Laney.61 The defendant challenged the award for future medical services, claiming that § 2259 did not
authorize compensation for amounts the victims have not yet spent.62 The
Laney court dismissed the defendant’s argument and held that compensation for future counseling expenses was proper where the cost of the
counseling was ascertainable at the time of sentencing.63 In United States v.
Danser,64 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the costs of future
psychiatric therapy were ascertainable where the district court conducted a
hearing that addressed the victim’s need for long-term counseling, and the
victim’s treating psychologist provided figures to determine the weekly cost
of counseling for the next seventy-five years.65
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Pearson,66
using the same reasoning as the Ninth Circuit in Laney, and the Seventh
Circuit in Danser, stated a restitution order pursuant to § 2259 might include an amount for future medical expenses.67 However, the district court
had not adequately explained the restitution award for future medical
expenses.68 Thus, the case was remanded to the district court for a more
thorough explanation of the $974,902 restitution award.69 This long line of
cases demonstrates that restitution can be awarded for both past and future
medical expenses, as long as the costs are ascertainable at the time of
sentencing.70
2.

Physical and Occupational Therapy or Rehabilitation

Restitution for the cost of physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation can also be awarded under § 2259.71 Recently, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, in United States v.
Johnston,72 awarded restitution to the male and female victims for physical
health care costs resulting from the defendant’s sexually abusive conduct.73
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 967 n.14 (noting the cost of future counseling was ascertainable because the
government’s estimate of the amount was well-supported and exact and the defendant did not
contest it).
64. 270 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2001).
65. Danser, 270 F.3d at 455-56.
66. 570 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2009).
67. Pearson, 570 F.3d at 486.
68. Id. at 487.
69. Id.
70. See cases cited supra notes 57-69.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(B) (2010).
72. No. 7:09-CR-72-D, 2010 WL 1640933 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 6, 2010).
73. Johnston, No. 7:09-CR-72-D, 2010 WL 1640933, at *4.
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Typically, however, the government does not seek restitution under this
element for child pornography victims because their losses are emotional
rather than physical.74 If a victim requires restitution for physical therapy
or rehabilitation, a court has the ability to authorize an award under
§ 2259.75
3. Necessary Transportation, Temporary Housing, and Child
Care Expenses
An offender may be required to compensate the victim, or the victim’s
family, for transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses
under § 2259.76 In United States v. Estep,77 the court held that restitution
was owed to the mother of a child victim for the child’s transportation
expenses to a new school.78 The court calculated the anticipated future cost
of driving the child to school until the child was old enough to take the
school bus to middle school.79 The Estep court held that the cost of transportation was a proximate result of the defendant’s crimes, and thus the
victim’s mother was entitled to restitution.80 Therefore, if the costs of
transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses can be reasonably calculated, and are ascertainable at the time of sentencing, the court is
required to award restitution for these costs pursuant to § 2259.81
4.

Lost Income

Section 2259 requires the defendant to compensate the victim for
income lost as a result of the offense.82 Lost income under the statute can
be difficult to calculate for child victims because they have never been
employed. Any monetary figure presented would be a speculative calculation of income the victim might lose in the future.83 Restitution for future
lost income represents a significant development in federal criminal
74. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (noting many child pornography victims seek restitution
for medical services relating to psychiatric or psychological care).
75. § 2259(b)(3)(B).
76. § 2259(b)(3)(C). “Victims” includes the abused and exploited children and their
guardians. § 2259(c).
77. 378 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Ky. 2005).
78. Estep, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 772.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. § 2259(b)(3)(C).
82. § 2259(b)(3)(D).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050, at
*5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (illustrating the government’s evidence in possession cases is often
an actuarial analysis containing a monetary figure of what the victim’s lost future income would
likely be).
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restitution jurisprudence.84 Courts have frequently held that lost future
income cannot be awarded to the victim if the costs are unascertainable at
the time of sentencing.85 Because very few courts have analyzed the
question of future lost income in the context of restitution to the victim of a
child exploitation offense, it is helpful to review such claims under a
primary restitution statute such as the MVRA.86
In United States v. Oslund,87 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted
the MVRA did not distinguish between past and future income.88 The
Oslund court stated “because future income is income that is lost to the
victim as a direct result of the crime, the plain language of the statute leads
to the conclusion that lost future income can be included in a restitution
order.”89 However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States
v. Fountain,90 held that because the term “future” was not in the statute, “an
order requiring a calculation of lost future earnings unduly complicates the
sentencing process and is thus not authorized.”91 Other circuits analyzing
future lost income awards under federal restitution statutes have held that
restitution may be awarded for lost future income.92 These cases illustrate

84. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 7:18 (“[Restitution for future lost income] represents
one of the most expansive new areas of authorized restitution under the restitutions statutes, for a
non-listed harm. This is particularly remarkable because future lost income is historically a
distinctively civil kind of damage, or remedy.”).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 801-02 (7th Cir. 1985) (reversing a
restitution award, granted under a different restitution statute that compensated for an injured
victim’s lost future wages). “[T]he difficult[y] . . . of translating an uncertain future stream of
earnings into a present value” means that “projecting lost future earnings has no place in criminal
sentencing if the amount or present value of those earnings is in dispute.” Id.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 967 n.14 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to
order restitution for future lost wages and suggesting that “an order of restitution for future losses
may be inappropriate because the amount of loss is too difficult to confirm or calculate.” (citing
Fountain, 768 F.2d at 801-02 )); United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 n.5 (7th Cir. 2001)
(distinguishing future counseling expenses from future earnings and suggesting the mental trauma
the victim suffered resulted in a loss that had been incurred and that “will continue to manifest
itself for years,” as opposed to compensation for future wages that had not yet been earned).
87. 453 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2006).
88. Oslund, 453 F.3d at 1062-63.
89. Id.
90. 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985).
91. Fountain, 768 F.2d at 801-02.
92. See United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding the
district court properly exercised its “abundant discretion” when it ordered restitution under the
MVRA for future lost income to the estate of a three-month-old homicide victim); United States v.
Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating “[t]he plain language of the MVRA
contemplates an award of restitution to the victim’s estate for future lost income and certainly
does not expressly exclude such an award.”); see also United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286,
1291-92 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding an estimate of loss relating to income and earning potential is
sufficient for a restitution order, where exact loss is impossible to determine); United States v.
Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (awarding future lost income under the VWPA to
a fire department in an arson-homicide case); United States v. Razo-Leora, 961 F.2d 1140, 1146
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that restitution can be awarded for past and future lost income, provided the
monetary figure is not speculative and the costs are ascertainable at the time
of sentencing.93
5.

Attorney’s Fees, As Well As Other Costs Incurred

A victim can be compensated for attorney’s fees as well as other costs
incurred under § 2259.94 If a court finds that a victim was harmed as a
result of the defendant’s conduct and is entitled to restitution, the court will
likely award attorney’s fees to the victim.95 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in United States v. Hicks,96 recently awarded attorney’s fees as part of a restitution award to a child pornography victim reasoning that § 2259 requires the victim to be compensated for the “full amount of their losses.”97 Thus, courts must order
attorney’s fees to the victims to fully compensate them for their losses.98
6. Any Other Losses Suffered by the Victim as a Proximate
Result of the Offense
Section 2259 contains a “catch-all” provision stating the victim can be
compensated for any other losses incurred by the victim as a proximate
result of the offense not specifically listed in the statute.99 The phrase “any
other losses” could potentially include claims for pain and suffering or loss
of enjoyment of life, the claims typically awarded in the context of civil
cases.100 However, courts generally do not include pain and suffering or
(5th Cir. 1992) (affirming an order granting victim’s widow $100,000 in restitution under the
VWPA, based on lost income).
93. See United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 967 n.14 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting “an order of
restitution for future losses may be inappropriate because the amount of loss is too difficult to
confirm or calculate”).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(E) (2010).
95. See United States v. Estep, 378 F. Supp. 2d 763, 774 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (holding attorney’s
fees could be included in a restitution award where, even though the attorney was also representing the victims in a civil case, the costs were clearly on behalf of the victims).
96. No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260 (E.D. Va. Nov. 29, 2009).
97. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *5; see § 2259(b)(1).
98. § 2259(b)(3).
99. § 2259(b)(3)(F).
100. See United States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2008) (“While the availability of a civil remedy is relevant in determining who is an MVRA victim, the amount of restitution that may be awarded is limited to the victim’s provable actual loss, even if more punitive
remedies would be available in a civil action.”); United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1128
(10th Cir. 2007) (concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion by treating a restitution
analysis in a criminal case differently that an award of damages in a civil case); United States v.
Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 618-19 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting restitution “is less generous than common law
damages . . . . This distinction is consistent with the historic distinction between restitution and
damages, the former originally referring to the restoration of something that the defendant had
taken from the plaintiff”); United States v. Havens, 424 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A civil
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loss of enjoyment of life awards in restitution orders because such damages
are not based on “actual loss.”101 In United States v. Petruk,102 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals looked to congressional intent when it held restitution was a compensatory remedy and victims should be limited to compensation for their actual losses.103 Other circuits have also held the victim’s
losses must be actual and not consequential or incidental.104 Thus, because
courts are not inclined to order restitution when the victim’s losses are too
speculative, it is unlikely this “catch-all” category will often be utilized for
seeking restitution for other losses, such as pain and suffering or loss of
enjoyment of life.105 Congress included this sixth category of loss to keep
restitution broad under § 2259; as a result, courts have discretion to order
restitution for other losses not specifically listed in the statute if the defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of the victim’s loss.106
III. WHO IS ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2259?
Until recently, prosecutors had not sought restitution in criminal cases
where a defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography images.107 Previously, the offenders who were ordered to pay restitution
under § 2259 were those offenders who had produced pornographic images
of children.108 Now, victims are asking courts to require defendants who
judgment award by itself, however, is insufficient to support an order of restitution because some
damages and costs recoverable in a civil action, such as treble damages, consequential damages,
and attorneys’ fees spent in pursuing litigation against the wrongdoer, do not qualify as losses
under the MVRA.”).
101. Serawop, 505 F.3d at 1124 (stating “the MVRA does not provide incidental,
consequential, or pain and suffering awards.”).
102. 484 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2007).
103. Petruk, 484 F.3d at 1038.
104. See United States v. Rhodes, 330 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that under the
MVRA, “the statute implicitly requires that the restitution award be based on the amount of loss
actually caused by the defendant’s offense”); United States v. Barton, 366 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th
Cir. 2004) (providing “there is general agreement that a restitution order under the MVRA cannot
encompass consequential damages resulting from the defendant’s conduct.”); United States v.
Seward, 272 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding restitution is based on the amount of actual
loss caused by the offense, and excludes consequential or incidental damages).
105. See discussion supra Part II.B.4 (discussing how courts are reluctant to order restitution
when the monetary figure is speculative or too difficult to ascertain).
106. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’ intent to include broad
restitution under the Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children Act); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2259(b)(3)(F) (2010).
107. See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 790 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2009)
(providing “[r]estitution in possession cases is an issue of first impression in district courts around
the nation as the Government has only recently begun seeking restitution from possessors of child
pornography on behalf of victims.”); see also United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-cr-00165-WWE
(D. Conn. Feb.23, 2009) (being one of the first district courts to hold that a defendant convicted of
possessing, but not creating, illegal images of child pornography, pay restitution to a victim).
108. Paroline, No. 6:08-CR-61, 2009 WL 4572786, at *7.
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possess pornographic images of the victims to pay restitution.109 This development has presented difficult questions to courts. How is “victim”
defined under § 2259? If a child pornography victim is a victim under the
statute, is the victim harmed as a result of the defendant’s possession of the
victim’s images? Furthermore, if the victim is harmed, is the harm compensable under § 2259? Courts are divided on how to answer these questions. Part A of this section defines the term “victim” under § 2259, Part B
examines whether the statute imposes a proximate cause requirement, and
Part C analyzes whether a child pornography victim is harmed when a
defendant possesses pornographic images of the victim. Part C also
addresses whether, if the victim is harmed, the harm is compensable under
§ 2259.
A. DEFINING “VICTIM”: THE CAUSATION CONTROVERSY
Section 2259 broadly defines “victim” as an “individual harmed as a
result of a commission of a crime under this chapter.”110 Congress defined
“harm” liberally in § 2259 in order to protect children victimized by child
pornography.111 Significantly, Congress has used a much narrower definition of victim in other crime victim restitution statutes, for example, that the
“victim” be a “person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered . . . .”112
The words “directly and proximately” do not appear in § 2259, indicating
the harm a person must suffer to be a victim of a child pornography offense
need not be “direct” nor “proximate” in order to qualify for victim status.113
Thus, the plain language of the statue indicates that any kind of “harm” is
sufficient to create victim status for purposes of § 2259.114 Despite the
plain language of the statute, not all courts agree a victim of an offender
who possesses pornographic images of the victim is a victim entitled to

109. Id.
110. § 2259(c) (emphasis added); see supra note 48 (discussing the crimes listed under
chapter 110, specifically including crimes related to child pornography).
111. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Sen. Biden, Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (“Protecting our children from abuse and exploitation at the hands of a stranger or a
neighbor or a trusted adult, or some cases a family member, is one of the most important duties of
our criminal justice system.”).
112. § 3663(a)(2) (emphasis added); accord § 3663A(a)(2) (using identical language).
113. See § 2259(c) (interpreting the plain language of the statute).
114. Brief of the National Crime Victim Law Institute et al. as Amici Curiae In Support of
Restitution for Amy and Other Victims of Child Pornography at 4, United States v. Paroline, 672
F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
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restitution under § 2259.115 Some courts have held there is a proximate
cause requirement between the victim’s losses and the particular defendant’s conduct.116
B. DOES THE STATUTE IMPOSE A PROXIMATE CAUSE REQUIREMENT?
Section 2259 provides that restitution is available for the “full amount
of the victim’s losses.”117 For five of the six categories of losses recognized
in § 2259, there is no proximate cause requirement. For the sixth “catchall” category, a proximate cause requirement exists. Section 2259 promises
victims of child pornography offenses that the court “shall direct the
defendant to pay the victim [through the appropriate court mechanism] the
full amount of the victim’s losses . . . .”118 The statute goes on to provide
six categories of damages, only one of which contains a proximate cause
requirement:
(3) Definition.—For purposes of this subsection, the term “full
amount of the victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the
victim for—
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or
psychological care;
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child
care expenses;
(D) lost income;
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate
result of the offense.119
As the plain language of the statute indicates, a victim need only show
various losses were the “proximate result” of the offense when seeking
restitution under subsection (b)(3)(F).120 There is no language regarding a
“proximate” connection under the first five categories of losses.121 Accordingly, it can be presumed Congress acted intentionally and purposely in the
115. See, e.g., United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 498050, at
*5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (denying restitution to child pornography victim).
116. Id.; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
117. § 2259(b)(1).
118. Id.
119. § 2259(b)(3) (emphasis added); see discussion supra Parts II.B.1-6 (discussing the six
categories of damages and the amount of restitution the victim is entitled to under each category).
120. § 2259(b)(3)(F).
121. § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E).
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disparate inclusion or exclusion of the proximate result language.122
However, many courts that have analyzed restitution claims under § 2259
have concluded the United States must show the victim was harmed as a
proximate cause of the offense of the conviction.123
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Paroline,124
declined to order restitution pursuant to § 2259 because the government
failed to show the victim’s losses were proximately caused by the defendant’s possession of the victim’s images.125 The Paroline court upheld the
district court’s interpretation of § 2259 as including a proximate cause
requirement for each category of loss under the statute.126 The district court
reasoned the United States Supreme Court has held “[w]hen several words
are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other
words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that
the clause be read as applicable to all.”127 Based on this authority, the court
held the phrase “as a proximate result of the offense” would apply equally
to all the loss categories in § 2259.128 To construe the statute otherwise, the
court reasoned, would likely violate the Eighth Amendment.129 The court

122. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
123. See United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding § 2259 incorporates a requirement of proximate causation); see, e.g., United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154,
1160 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Raplinger, No. 05-CR-49-LRR, 2007 WL 3285802 (N.D.
Iowa Oct. 9, 2007); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 126 (10th Cir. 1999). This interprettation is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of a pre-MVRA statute,
which permitted the district courts to order restitution “in the case of an offense resulting in
[harm]” to the victim—language similar to 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c). Hughey v. United States, 495
U.S. 411, 418-20 n.3 (1990) (citation omitted). In Hughey, the court confirmed the necessity of a
causal nexus between the offense and the harm to the victim and held that “the loss caused by the
conduct underlying the offense of conviction establishes the outer limits of a restitution order.” Id.
at 420. However, when the offense of conviction is scheme or conspiracy, the victim is entitled to
restitution resulting from harms caused by the defendant’s individual actions, as well as harms
caused by others involved in the scheme or conspiracy. Laney, 189 F.3d at 965; United States v.
Bright, 353 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Theodore, 354 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2003); United States v. Grice, 319 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Newsome,
322 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Ross, 210 F.3d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Jackson, 155 F.3d 942, 949 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Brewer, 983 F.2d
181, 185 (10th Cir. 1993).
124. 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
125. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
126. Id. at 791.
127. Id. at 788 (citing Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920)).
128. Id.; see also United States v. Berk, No. 08-CR-212-P-S, 2009 WL 3451085, at *5
(D.Me. Oct. 29, 2009) (stating “the natural construction of [§ 2259] demands that the proximate
cause requirement be read as applicable to every class of loss set forth in the statute.”).
129. Id. at 789 (holding a restitution award not limited to losses proximately caused by the
defendant’s conduct would most likely violate the Eighth Amendment’s protection against
excessive fines).

222

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:205

noted, however, that determining a restitution award under § 2259 is an
“inexact science” not requiring mathematical precision.130
Recently, in United States v. Hardy,131 the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania held that § 2259 imposes a proximate
cause requirement in a case where the defendant was convicted and ordered
to pay restitution for possessing child pornography images.132 Both the
government and the defendant in Hardy agreed there was a proximate cause
requirement; however, each would have had the court apply the proximate
cause requirement differently.133 Courts are simply unclear on how to
interpret the plain language of the statute and, as a result, are either awarding smaller restitution awards than mandated by the statute or no restitution
awards at all.134
When courts hold restitution cannot be awarded to victims of defendants who possess pornographic images of the victims, courts are ignoring
both the plain language of the mandatory restitution statute and the
congressional intent behind it.135 To hold that a defendant who possessed
pornographic images of a child did not harm the child constitutes “clear and
indisputable error.”136 Congress mandated broad restitution for a minor
victim following an offender’s conviction of federal child sexual exploitation offenses.137
Courts are needlessly opining as to the correct causation standard under
the statute.138 The plain language of the statute dictates mandatory
restitution to “any individual harmed as a result [of a child pornography

130. Id. at 791-92; see United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2007); see
also United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455-56 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that mathematical
precision is not required in the causal analysis upholding a restitution award of $304, 200); United
States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that in contexts involving awards
to child victims of sexual exploitation, a district court has significant discretion to make a reasonable estimate of an amount that reflects the full loss to the victim); United States v. Crandon, 173
F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding a restitution award under § 2259 calculated by the district
court using “reasonable certainty”).
131. No. 09-151, 2010 WL 1543844 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2010).
132. Hardy, No. 09-151, 2010 WL 1543844, at *7.
133. Id.
134. See id. at *8 (stating “[i]n context, the phrases ‘as a result of’ and ‘as a proximate result
of’ are unclear.”). “The boundaries of proximate cause are murky.” Id. at *13.
135. United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 788 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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crime].”139 As explained below, when a defendant possesses pornographic
images of a child, the defendant is clearly causing the victim harm.140
C. HOW VICTIMS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION CASES
ARE HARMED BY DEFENDANTS’ CRIMES
More than twenty-seven years ago, in New York v. Ferber,141 the
United States Supreme Court noted that “the use of children as subjects of
pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and
mental health of the child.”142 Specifically, sexually exploited children
have difficulty developing healthy relationships later in life and are more
likely to become sexual abusers as adults.143 When the abuse is recorded
and distributed, the child’s privacy interests are invaded as well.144 The
Ferber court also observed that the “materials produced are a permanent
record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation.”145 The court continued:
[P]ornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than
does sexual abuse or prostitution. Because the child’s actions are
reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt him in future
years, long after the original misdeed took place. A child who has
posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within the mass distribution system for child
pornography. . . . [I]t is the fear of exposure and the tension of
keeping the act secret that seem to have the most profound
emotional repercussions.146
In Ferber, the United States Supreme Court clearly illustrated that
defendants who possess pornographic images continually harm the child
victim by viewing and keeping the images in circulation.147

139. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c) (2010).
140. See discussion infra Part III.C (explaining how victims of child pornography are harmed
by the defendants’ crimes).
141. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
142. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
143. Id. at 758 n.9.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 759 n.10 (citing David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of
Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981)); Christopher T. Donnelly,
Note, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward Constitutional and Enforceable
Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 295, 301(1979); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
109-10 (1990) (reaffirming the Ferber holding in a case involving possession of child
pornography).
147. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
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Twenty-three years later, the Supreme Court again acknowledged the
harm to victims depicted in child pornography, and observed that a new
harm was caused each time the images were shared with someone different.148 The appellate courts have held in numerous cases that the children
depicted in pornographic materials are victims harmed by the possession,
receipt, distribution, and production of their images.149 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in United States v. Norris,150 rejected the defendant’s
argument that receiving child pornography was a victimless crime, and that
the children depicted in child pornography could only be victims in an
indirect sense.151 The Norris court noted that the “victimization of the
children involved does not end when the pornographer’s camera is put
away.”152 The consumers, or end recipients, of pornographic material cause
the children depicted in those materials to suffer as a result of their actions
in at least three ways:
First, the simple fact that the images have been disseminated
perpetuates the abuse initiated by the producer of the materials.
[T]he materials produced are a permanent record of the children’s
participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
circulation. The consumer who “merely” or “passively” receives
or possesses child pornography directly contributes to this continuing victimization.
Second, the mere existence of child pornography represents an
invasion of the privacy of the child depicted. Both the Supreme
Court and Congress have explicitly acknowledged that the child
victims of child pornography are directly harmed by this despicable intrusion on the lives of the young and the innocent. The
recipient of child pornography obviously perpetuates the existence
148. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2005) (noting “as a permanent
record of a child’s abuse, the continued circulation itself would harm the child who had
participated. Like a defamatory statement, each new publication of the speech would cause new
injury to the child’s reputation and emotional well-being.” (emphasis added)).
149. See cases cited supra note 123 (providing examples of cases where courts of appeals
have held that victims are harmed by the defendant’s possession of pornographic images); see also
United States v. Freeman, Case No. 3:08-CR-22-002 (N.D. Fla. July 9, 2009); United States v.
Staples, Case No. 2:09-CR-14017 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2009). In reaching its decision that a
conviction for possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) is a crime
involving moral turpitude, the Ninth Circuit found that child pornography causes continuing
“injury to a child’s reputation and well-being.” United States v. Santacruz, 563 F.3d 894, 897 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“Because possession of child pornography offends conventional morality and visits
continuing injury on children, it is vile, base or depraved and . . . violates societal moral standards.” (citation omitted, emphasis added)).
150. 159 F.3d 926 (5th Cir. 1998).
151. Norris, 159 F.3d at 929.
152. Id.
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of the images received, and therefore the recipient may be considered to be invading the privacy of the children depicted, directly
victimizing these children.
Third, the consumer of child pornography instigates the original
production of child pornography by providing an economic motive
for creating and distributing the materials . . . . [T]here is no sense
in distinguishing, as Norris has done, between the producers and
the consumers of child pornography. Neither could exist without
the other. The consumers of child pornography therefore victimize
the children depicted in child pornography by enabling and supporting the continued production of child pornography, which entails continuous direct abuse and victimization of child subjects.153
Congress has also long recognized the harm inflicted on victims of
child pornography.154 In the legislative history of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996, Congress noted that the physiological, emotional,
and mental health of a child who was used as the subject of pornographic
material was harmed.155 More recently, Congress again addressed the
impact of child pornography in the legislative history behind the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.156 Congress found that:
[T]he illegal production, transportation, distribution, receipt,
advertising and possession of child pornography, as defined in
section 2256(8) of title 18, United States Code . . . is harmful to
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the children
depicted in child pornography and has a substantial and detrimental effect on society as a whole . . . . Every instance of viewing images of child pornography represents a renewed violation of
the privacy of the victims and a repetition of their abuse.157
In addition to the courts’ and Congress’ recognition of the long-term
harms associated with child pornography, the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children sponsored a study that looked into arrested offenders who possessed child pornography.158 The study revealed individuals

153. Id. at 929-30 (quotations omitted).
154. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 14 (1996) (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759
(1982)).
155. Id.
156. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501, 120
Stat. 587, 623 (2006).
157. Id.
158. Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children on Issues of Restitution
for Victims of Child Pornography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 at 6, United States v. Paroline, 672 F.
Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
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possessing child pornography images added to the lasting burden of child
victims.159 The victims know their pictures are circulating on the Internet
and are perpetually victimized by the continued circulation and possession
of their images.160 For the foregoing reasons, victims are clearly harmed as
a result of the defendant’s possession of their images. Therefore, courts
need to order restitution to these victims. The plain language of the statute
and congressional intent mandates restitution to child pornography victims.161 The next section illustrates a proposed amendment to the mandatory restitution statute that would eliminate controversy surrounding the
causation requirement of the statute.
IV. ELIMINATING THE CAUSATION CONTROVERSY:
A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO § 2259
Federal courts around the nation are being called on to consider restitution awards under § 2259, and the courts are disagreeing as to the causation
requirement under the statute.162 An amendment to § 2259 would likely
eliminate controversy regarding the causation language in the statute.163
Some courts have held that § 2259 requires the victims’ harm be a “proximate cause” of the defendant’s possession of their pornographic images.164
Some courts have not addressed the causation issue at all,165 while others
have found § 2259 requires that the victim’s harm lie somewhere in between “proximate cause” and general harm to the victim by the defendant’s
possession of the victim’s images.166

159. Id.
160. Id. at 7.
161. See discussion supra Part III.B (analyzing the proximate cause requirement of § 2259).
162. See infra notes 163-167 and accompanying text.
163. See United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov.
24, 2009) (“In surveying those of our sister districts which have grappled with requests for restitution in similar cases, it is apparent that the issue of causation remains the most contested
point.”); see also Garvin, supra note 9, at 1 (suggesting a court-based or legislative solution is
needed in order to eliminate the varied interpretations of § 2259 and to avoid further harming
child victims).
164. See supra text accompanying note 123; see also United States v. Simon, 2009 WL
2424673, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009) (stating “a restitution order in [an end-user possession]
case must be based upon the identification of a specific injury to the victim that was caused by the
specific conduct of the defendant.”).
165. See United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 2, 2009) (ordering a possessor criminal defendant to pay $3,680,153 in restitution to a victim
without addressing the proximate causation issue).
166. See Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (holding a restitution award was proper because the defendant’s actions presented a sufficiently
“proximate tie” to the victims injuries). The court also held § 2259 does not clearly demand a
“proximate cause” standard. Id. at *3.
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If Congress eliminated the “proximate result” language from category
(F) of the statute, some courts would have a much weaker argument that
categories (A) through (E) also require a proximate causation requirement.167 Courts continue to opine as to whether category (F) alone imposes
the proximate causation language, or if the language is applicable to all the
categories.168 Eliminating the language would force courts to look at the
real issue in these cases: defendants who possess pornographic images of
children are harming the victims, and the victims deserve restitution.169 If
the “proximate result” language did not exist in category (F), courts would
have to define “victim” using the plain language of the statute, and “the
term ‘victim’ would mean the individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter.”170
Alternatively, Congress could amend the statute to include language
indicating that for all the categories, the victim’s harms must be a proximate
cause of the defendant’s conduct; language could also be added mandating
this causal relationship be established upon a showing that the statutory
definition of “victim” is met.171 In summary, because child pornography
victims are harmed as a result of the defendant’s possession of their images,
a restitution award is proper under the statute.172 Courts need to enforce the
mandatory language of the statute and order restitution in all cases where
victims can be identified.173 The specific process for amending the language of the statute is beyond the scope of this article, but it is important to
note how a change would impact federal courts’ restitution holdings. Congress intended for the language of the statute to be broad in order to fully
compensate child pornography victims for their losses.174 The impact of
§ 2259 is far-reaching, and the next section describes the statute’s impact on
the North Dakota federal court system.
167. See United States v. Paroline, No. 6:08-CR-61, 2009 WL 4572786, at *5 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 7, 2009) (holding that the phrase “as a proximate result of the offense” would apply equally
to all the loss categories in § 2259(b)(3) because the language is included in category (F)).
168. Id.
169. See discussion supra Part III.C (explaining how victims of child pornography are
harmed by the defendants’ crimes).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c) (2010).
171. See Garvin, supra note 9, at 23 (“A proper reading of Section 2259, together with prior
court and Congressional findings on the harms that stem from possession, mandates that this
causal relationship is sufficiently established upon a showing that the statutory definition of
“victim” is met.”).
172. See discussion supra Part III.C (explaining how victims of child pornography are
harmed by the defendants’ crimes).
173. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Robbing the Rich to Feed the Poor?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 261, 263 (1999) (stating courts should identify victims even when they are numerous and
calculate harm even when such an analysis is complex).
174. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (considering the purposes of federal restitution law).

228

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:205

V. IMPACT ON THE NORTH DAKOTA FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM
Although the mandatory restitution for sexual exploitation crimes of
children was enacted in 1994, cases seeking a restitution order under this
statute rarely appear in federal district courts.175 The reason is not that
prosecution of child pornography offenders had decreased.176 In fact,
prosecutions of child pornography cases have increased.177 So, why are
restitution orders under § 2259 not increasing as well? Simply put,
prosecutors are not seeking the restitution orders.178
Recently, a federal district court judge in St. Paul, Minnesota, issued an
order demanding to know why restitution was not even requested by the
United States Attorney’s Office in the case of a Minnesota man who
pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography.179 Judge Schilz stated
restitution for child pornography victims must be considered and “[t]he
Court will no longer accept silence.”180 The Department of Justice responded by stating “[t]his is an emerging issue and one we are looking at
very closely. We will seek restitution in those cases where we believe it is
appropriate and authorized by law.”181
The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of North Dakota
has responded in a similar way and agrees that seeking a restitution order
under § 2259 for an offender who possesses pornographic images of
children is an emerging issue for North Dakota and all federal district
courts.182 Assistant United States Attorney and Civil Chief Shon Hastings
agrees that a restitution award under this section is proper where the
defendant possessed pornographic images of a victim who is identifiable.183
The United States’ Attorney’s Office for the District of North Dakota will
begin seeking restitution awards under § 2259 in cases where the defendant

175. See Walsh, supra note 1 (stating federal district court Judge Schiltz indicated the local
U.S. attorney’s office has been mute on the issue of restitution in child pornography cases).
176. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Federal Prosecution of
Child Sex Exploitation Offenders (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf
(providing sex offenses were among the fastest growing crimes handled by the federal justice
system, and child pornography matters accounted for eighty-two percent of the growth in sex
exploitation matters referred to U.S. attorneys from 1994 to 2006).
177. Id.
178. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
179. Walsh, supra note 1.
180. See id. (stating the U.S. attorney must submit a memorandum by Jan. 29, 2010, explaining why the victim is not entitled to restitution).
181. Id.
182. Telephone Interview with Shon Hastings, Civil Chief, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District
of North Dakota (Jan. 22, 2010).
183. Id.
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has possessed pornographic images of children.184 The Department of
Justice’s position is that restitution should be awarded where the victims are
identifiable, and the victims should be compensated for the “full amount of
[their] losses” in accordance with the statute.185 Restitution in child pornography cases is an issue that United States Attorney’s Offices around the
nation are currently facing and will be facing more readily in the near
future.186
VI. CONCLUSION
Child pornography victims not only deserve to be awarded restitution
for the full amount of their losses, but federal law mandates this result.187
Prosecutors need to seek restitution in all cases where child pornography
victims are identifiable, and courts need to uphold the restitution awards
sought by the government.188 Victims of child pornography face an uphill
battle in life, and receiving restitution for their losses is one step in the
healing process for them.189 Federal courts need to consider the victims and
order defendants who possess child pornography images to pay restitution
to the victims for the “full amount of the victim’s losses.”190
Ashleigh B. Boe*

184. Id. The first motion for restitution order under § 2259 was filed in the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota on February 19, 2010. Motion for Restitution
Order, United States v. Scheiring, No. 3:09-CR-56 (D.N.D. 2010).
185. Telephone Interview with Shon Hastings, supra note 182.
186. Id.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2010).
188. See Walsh, supra note 1 (“The Court will no longer accept silence [ordering prosecutors
to seek restitution for child pornography crimes].”).
189. See discussion supra Part III.C (explaining how victims of child pornography are
harmed by the defendants’ crimes).
190. § 2259(3).
*J.D. candidate at the University of North Dakota School of Law. Thank you to my family
for their love, support, and encouragement in everything that I do. A special thanks to Shon
Hastings for inspiring this topic.

